



Curtis A. Bradley† 
It is common for courts, the political branches, and academic commentators 
to look to historical governmental practices when interpreting the separation of 
powers. There has been relatively little attention, however, to the proper methodol-
ogy for invoking such “historical gloss.” This Essay contends that, in order to gain 
traction on the methodological questions, we need to begin by considering the po-
tential justifications for crediting gloss. For judicial application of gloss, which is 
this Essay’s principal focus, there are at least four such justifications: deference to 
the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors; limits on judicial capacity; Burkean 
consequentialism; and reliance interests. As the Essay explains, these differing jus-
tifications have differing methodological implications, and disaggregating them 
helps explain variations in the types of evidence that courts have credited in dis-
cerning gloss. Perhaps most notably, it helps explain why courts are often less de-
manding in requiring evidence of institutional acquiescence than commonly recited 
standards for gloss would tend to suggest. 
INTRODUCTION 
In discerning the Constitution’s separation of powers among 
the three branches of the federal government, it is common for 
courts, the political branches, and academic commentators to 
give weight to post-Founding governmental practice. There is 
substantial uncertainty, however, about the proper methodology 
for determining such “historical gloss.” In order to make pro-
gress on the methodological questions, this Essay contends that 
it is important to consider the potential justifications for credit-
ing gloss. For judicial application of gloss, which is this Essay’s 
principal focus, there are at least four such justifications: defer-
ence to the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors; limits on 
judicial capacity; Burkean consequentialism; and reliance inter-
ests. As the Essay explains, these differing justifications have 
differing methodological implications. This Essay considers in 
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particular the differing implications that these justifications 
have for what constitutes relevant “practice” for purposes of de-
termining gloss, and for the extent to which there must be a 
showing of institutional “acquiescence” in the practice. As the 
Essay shows, disaggregating the justifications for gloss helps 
explain variations in the types of evidence that courts have cred-
ited in discerning gloss. Perhaps most notably, it helps explain 
why courts are often less demanding in requiring evidence of in-
stitutional acquiescence than commonly recited standards for 
gloss would tend to suggest. 
In recent scholarship and Supreme Court opinions, there has 
been increased attention to the relevance of post-Founding gov-
ernmental practice in discerning the Constitution’s distribution 
of authority among the three branches of the federal government, 
as well as between the two houses of Congress.1 This approach to 
constitutional interpretation can be termed the “historical gloss” 
approach, after Justice Felix Frankfurter’s description and de-
fense of it in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v 
Sawyer.2 Frankfurter wrote separately in Youngstown to empha-
size the interpretive significance of “[d]eeply embedded tradi-
tional ways of conducting government,” which he contended could 
not “supplant the Constitution or legislation, but [could] give 
meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”3 Consistent with 
this idea, Frankfurter contended that “a systematic, unbroken, 
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress 
and never before questioned, . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘ex-
ecutive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”4 
Although the Supreme Court has invoked gloss in a number 
of separation-of-powers decisions, both before and after Youngs-
town, its most extended consideration of this approach to consti-
tutional interpretation occurred in 2014, in National Labor  
Relations Board v Noel Canning.5 In that case, the Court inter-
preted the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution, 
which provides that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up 
 
 1 See, for example, Zivotofsky v Kerry, 135 S Ct 2076, 2091–94 (2015); National 
Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning, 134 S Ct 2550, 2559 (2014). See also Curtis A. 
Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 
Harv L Rev 411, 417–24 (2012) (describing the prevalence of arguments rooted in histor-
ical gloss). 
 2 343 US 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter concurring). 
 3 Id at 610 (Frankfurter concurring). 
 4 Id at 610–11 (Frankfurter concurring). 
 5 134 S Ct 2550 (2014). 
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all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, 
by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their 
next Session,”6 as allowing the president to make recess ap-
pointments during breaks within a yearly session of Congress 
and to fill governmental posts that become vacant before the 
breaks.7 In doing so, the Court placed “significant weight” on 
historical governmental practice relating to appointments.8 The 
Court explained that such weight was appropriate because the 
relevant constitutional text was ambiguous and “the interpre-
tive questions before us concern the allocation of power between 
two elected branches of Government.”9 Reviewing its precedent, 
the Court observed that it had “treated practice as an important 
interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that 
practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began 
after the founding era.”10 The following year, in Zivotofsky v 
Kerry,11 the Court again gave weight to historical governmental 
practice in concluding that the president had an exclusive power 
to recognize foreign sovereigns and their territories, and in do-
ing so it invoked its analysis from Noel Canning.12 
Outside the courts, the gloss approach has long been a 
prominent feature of executive branch legal reasoning. To take 
just a few examples from the last several decades, executive 
branch lawyers have invoked gloss in support of a broad execu-
tive authority to conclude binding international agreements 
without obtaining the advice and consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate;13 a unilateral executive authority to terminate or sus-
pend treaty obligations;14 a presidential power to initiate certain 
 
 6 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 3. 
 7 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2567, 2573. 
 8 Id at 2559 (emphasis omitted). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id at 2560. 
 11 135 S Ct 2076 (2015). 
 12 See id at 2091, 2096. 
 13 See Office of Legal Counsel, Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Rati-
fication as a Treaty: Memorandum Opinion for the United States Trade Representative, 
18 Op Off Legal Counsel 232, 233 (Nov 22, 1994) (contending that for this issue “a signif-
icant guide to the interpretation of the Constitution’s requirements is the practical con-
struction placed on it by the executive and legislative branches acting together”). 
 14 See John C. Yoo and Robert J. Delahunty, Memorandum for John Bellinger, III, 
Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security 
Council: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty *13 
(DOJ, Nov 15, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6AR-KCBX (“The normative role of 
historical practice in constitutional law, and especially with regard to separation of pow-
ers, is well settled.”). 
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military conflicts without congressional authorization;15 and an 
exclusive presidential authority to recognize foreign sovereigns 
and their territory.16 As these examples illustrate, invocations of 
gloss are especially common with respect to matters relating to 
US foreign relations, although they are not confined to that sub-
ject area. Although less systematically studied, gloss reasoning 
has also been common in deliberations and debates within Con-
gress about the separation of powers.17 
The effect of gloss is sometimes so strong that it essentially 
eliminates constitutional debate. For example, the argument 
(associated most notably with Justice Joseph Story18) that the 
text of Article III requires that Congress vest the federal courts 
with the full extent of the judicial power described in that Article 
is a nonstarter in light of the fact that Congress has never done 
so.19 Similarly, the Senate’s power to attach reservations to its 
advice and consent to treaties is beyond serious question, in 
large part because the Senate has engaged in this practice—
without significant objection by the executive branch—for much 
of American history.20 Another example of constitutional author-
ity that is now largely taken for granted as a result of long-
standing practice is the president’s authority, without seeking 
 
 15 See Office of Legal Counsel, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya: Memoran-
dum Opinion for the Attorney General *7 (Apr 1, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/B9R5 
-L5YN (“This understanding of the President’s constitutional authority reflects not only 
the express assignment of powers and responsibilities to the President and Congress in 
the Constitution, but also, as noted, the ‘historical gloss’ placed on the Constitution by 
two centuries of practice.”). 
 16 See Brief for the Respondent, Zivotofsky v Kerry, Docket No 13-628, *26 (US filed 
Sept 22, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 4924107) (“More than two hundred 
years of historical practice confirms what the Constitution’s text and structure make 
clear: The recognition power belongs exclusively to the Executive.”). 
 17 See generally, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical 
Gloss, 92 Tex L Rev 773 (2014) (documenting the use of gloss reasoning in Congress 
about the Constitution’s distribution of authority to terminate or suspend treaty obliga-
tions); Curtis A. Bradley and Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, 
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 Georgetown L J 255 (2017) (documenting the 
use of gloss reasoning in Congress about whether it has the constitutional authority to 
change the size of the Supreme Court and restrict its jurisdiction). 
 18 See Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 328 (1816) (Story) (“The 
language of [Article III] throughout is manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the 
legislature.”). 
 19 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U Pa L Rev 
1569, 1585–86 (1990) (noting that the first Judiciary Act did not extend full Article III 
jurisdiction to the federal courts). 
 20 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Con-
ditional Consent, 149 U Pa L Rev 399, 404–10 (2000). 
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authorization from Congress, to use military force to protect and 
rescue Americans endangered abroad.21 
Despite the importance and prevalence of the gloss ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation, its methodological un-
derpinnings have received relatively little attention. For exam-
ple, Professor Philip Bobbitt’s influential account of the 
“modalities” of constitutional interpretation does not even ex-
pressly consider gloss. Although Bobbitt refers to “history” as a 
modality, he defines it purely in originalist terms as focused on 
the intentions or understandings of the Framers and ratifiers of 
the text.22 
The methodological issues implicated by the gloss approach 
include the following: What counts as relevant “practice”? What 
is the required frequency, consistency, and duration of the prac-
tice? How does one decide on the proper level of generality at 
which to describe the practice? To what extent must there be in-
stitutional “acquiescence” or some other understanding of the 
practice? And how does gloss relate to other approaches to con-
stitutional interpretation?23 Professor Trevor Morrison and I 
considered the role of historical gloss at length in a 2012 article, 
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,24 and some of 
what is discussed here draws from that article. Nevertheless, 
our central focus in that article was demonstrating how modern 
congressional-executive relations complicate efforts to rely on 
governmental practice when interpreting the separation of pow-
ers,25 and we generally avoided taking a position on the proper 
methodology for “doing gloss.” 
This Essay contends that, in order to gain traction on the 
methodological questions, it is important first to consider the 
potential justifications for relying on historical practice when 
discerning the separation of powers. As this Essay shows, different 
 
 21 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Inter-
active Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 
NYU L Rev 689, 713–18 (2016). 
 22 See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 12 (Basil Blackwell 1991) (de-
scribing the historical modality as “relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers 
of the Constitution”); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 9 
(Oxford 1982) (“Historical arguments depend on a determination of the original under-
standing of the constitutional provision to be construed.”). 
 23 See Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 Harv L Rev F 75, 77–79 (2013). 
 24 See generally Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev 411 (cited in note 1). 
 25 See id at 448 (arguing that the “descriptive shortcomings” of James Madison’s 
ideas about the separation of powers “carry several significant implications for relying on 
ideas of institutional acquiescence to resolve separation of powers controversies”). 
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potential justifications for gloss have differing methodological 
implications. This disaggregation of justifications helps explain 
variations in the types of evidence that courts have credited in 
discerning gloss. Perhaps most notably, it helps explain why 
courts are often less demanding in requiring evidence of institu-
tional acquiescence than commonly recited standards for gloss 
would suggest. 
I.  POTENTIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CREDITING GLOSS 
Any consideration of how to “do” an approach to law is inevi-
tably intertwined with normative questions about the value of 
the approach, and that is true of the gloss approach to constitu-
tional interpretation. This is not the place for a full normative 
evaluation of gloss, which would require not only an account of 
its potential benefits but also an assessment of its potential 
drawbacks. Nor does this Essay attempt to situate gloss more 
generally within constitutional theory, something that has been 
explored in other writings.26 Instead, the aim here is simply to 
describe the most likely justifications for crediting gloss in dis-
cerning the separation of powers, particularly in judicial deci-
sions.27 A review of Supreme Court decisions and other materials 
that have invoked gloss suggests that there are at least four such 
justifications: deference to nonjudicial actors; limits on judicial 
capacity; Burkean consequentialism; and reliance interests. As 
will become apparent, probably the two most important, in terms 
of offering the most distinct visions about how to do gloss, are the 
deference justification and Burkean consequentialism.28 
A. Deference to Nonjudicial Actors 
The deference justification rests on the proposition that the 
courts do not have a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. 
Other governmental actors are sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
 
 26 See, for example, Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 424–28 (cited in note 1). 
 27 Although historical practice is potentially relevant to judicial decision-making in 
other areas of constitutional law, such as federalism and individual rights, those areas 
raise sufficiently distinct issues that they are not addressed here. In addition, this Essay 
is focused only on the relevance of the historical practices of governmental institutions 
and not on the relevance of other nonoriginalist history to constitutional analysis. 
 28 The justifications for executive branch or congressional invocation of gloss may 
differ to some extent from the justifications for judicial invocation of gloss, and these po-
tential differences are not explored here. For a discussion of some reasons why the exec-
utive branch relies on gloss, see Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 457–61 (cited 
in note 1). 
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and they must of necessity interpret it as part of their duties.29 
Moreover, with respect to separation-of-powers issues, political 
branch actors are likely to have a better understanding than 
courts of the practical consequences of particular constitutional 
interpretations. Furthermore, judicial deference to political 
branch understandings can reduce countermajoritarian concerns 
associated with constitutional judicial review, concerns that are 
especially strong when both political branches share a view that 
is different from the judiciary’s view, and have held that view for 
a long time. Giving weight to such views, this argument sug-
gests, can be a way of making constitutional interpretation more 
democratically legitimate. For these reasons, this justification 
suggests that if the political branches have coalesced around a 
constitutional interpretation, and that understanding has per-
sisted, it merits judicial deference.30 
B. Limits on Judicial Capacity 
A related justification for gloss concerns limits on judicial 
capacity. Sometimes courts invoke practice because other consti-
tutional materials are perceived to offer insufficient guidance.31 
This may be especially likely with respect to questions of execu-
tive power, given the limited textual guidance in Article II of the 
Constitution as well as substantial changes in the nature of the 
presidential office and international affairs over time.32 For such 
issues, unless the courts abstain altogether, relying on practice 
may offer the best option for a reasoned disposition of the case 
that seeks to avoid appealing simply to a policy assessment or 
“choosing a side” in a dispute between the branches. This justifi-
cation for looking to gloss is consistent with the concept of  
 
 29 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-judicial Precedent, 61 Vand L Rev 713, 746 (2008) 
(“[V]irtually every question of constitutional law that the Court hears already has been 
considered by one or more non-judicial actors.”). 
 30 For illustrations of this attitude in practice, see, for example, Zivotofsky, 135 S 
Ct at 2094 (“The weight of historical evidence indicates Congress has accepted that the 
power to recognize foreign states and governments and their territorial bounds is exclu-
sive to the Presidency.”); Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654, 680 (1981) (“Crucial to 
our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of 
claim settlement by executive agreement.”). 
 31 See, for example, Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2594 (Scalia concurring in the judg-
ment) (agreeing, while expressing reservations about practice-based arguments, that an 
“ambiguous constitutional provision” is ripe for historical analysis) (emphasis added). 
 32 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 417–18 (cited in note 1) (noting 
that Article II’s general language has given rise to a reliance on practice-based argu-
ments concerning the scope of presidential powers). 
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“constitutional construction” articulated by some theorists, 
which envisions that interpreters can draw on various materials 
to resolve constitutional meaning “when the Constitution as 
written cannot in good faith be said to provide a determinate an-
swer to a given question.”33 
C. Burkean Consequentialism 
The Burkean consequentialist justification rests on the 
premise that long-standing practices are suggestive of what 
works well, or at least what works better than anything the 
courts are likely to impose.34 These practices reflect the judg-
ments of many actors over time, informed by the realities of gov-
ernance and changes in the needs of governance, and therefore, 
the reasoning goes, they have the potential to embody collective 
wisdom. Under this rationale, the very persistence of a practice 
is evidence of its utility.35 In Noel Canning, for example, the 
Court claimed that the frequent and long-standing use of recess 
appointments “suggests that the Senate and President have rec-
ognized that recess appointments can be both necessary and ap-
propriate in certain circumstances.”36 
Burkean consequentialism also recognizes that long-
standing practices are likely to be embedded within a broader 
array of understandings and institutional behavior, such that 
undoing them carries a risk of unforeseen consequences, includ-
ing social and institutional disruption.37 That is, even if one is 
uncertain about the extent to which a particular practice is  
 
 33 Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 Const 
Commen 119, 120–21 (2010). See also Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 Const Commen 95, 96 (2010). 
 34 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev 353, 359 (2006) 
(“The argument for Burkeanism is that respect for traditions is likely to produce better 
results, all things considered, than reliance on theories of one or another kind, especially 
when those theories are deployed by such fallible human beings as judges.”). 
 35 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L 
Rev 877, 891–92 (1996) (noting that traditions “reflect a kind of rough empiricism: . . . 
they have been tested over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been found to be 
at least good enough”). 
 36 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2560. 
 37 See Mitchell Pearsall Reich, Incomplete Designs, 94 Tex L Rev 807, 831 (2016): 
A Burkean-minded judge deciding whether to upset a settled interpretation of 
a clause cannot contend just with history’s judgment that the interpretation of 
the clause itself is correct. She must also recognize history’s judgment that 
numerous institutional decisions that likely surround it—and which the judge 
may be unable to identify, let alone evaluate—are useful, workable, and correct 
as well. 
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optimal, the risks associated with unsettling the practice may 
outweigh any potential benefits that would be achieved. This 
idea, too, appears in the reasoning in Noel Canning. In explain-
ing why it should not overturn long-standing practice relating to 
recess appointments, the Court observed: “We have not previ-
ously interpreted the Clause, and, when doing so for the first 
time in more than 200 years, we must hesitate to upset the com-
promises and working arrangements that the elected branches 
of Government themselves have reached.”38 
D. Reliance Interests 
A related justification, which concerns a particular type of 
consequentialist consideration, is one based on reliance inter-
ests. This idea, similar to one of the justifications for stare deci-
sis,39 is that over time both governmental actors and third par-
ties (including, potentially, society at large) are likely to have 
adjusted their behavior to account for persistent practices, and 
that they may have made decisions and concessions based on 
this reliance. The more long-standing and entrenched the prac-
tice becomes, the more likely it is that the practice will have 
such reliance effects. This justification can also be found in Noel 
Canning, most notably in the Court’s observation that it was 
“reluctant to upset this traditional practice where doing so 
would seriously shrink the authority that Presidents have be-
lieved existed and have exercised for so long.”40 
* * * 
In thinking about these potential justifications for crediting 
historical gloss, three additional points should be kept in mind. 
First, although these justifications are analytically distinct, they 
overlap and are potentially mutually reinforcing. For example, 
limits on judicial capacity can be a justification for deference to 
political branch interpretation, and also for the risk aversion  
 
 38 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2560. See also generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated 
Structural Constitution, 114 Colum L Rev 1595 (2014) (offering a descriptive and norma-
tive account of bargains between governmental institutions concerning their authority). 
 39 See generally Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash & Lee 
L Rev 411 (2010). 
 40 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2573. See also United States v Midwest Oil Co, 236 US 
459, 472–73 (1915) (noting that “officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust them-
selves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department—on the presumption 
that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystal-
lize into a regular practice”). 
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associated with Burkean consequentialism. Moreover, the justi-
fications are not mutually exclusive: it would not be inconsistent 
for an interpreter to invoke more than one justification—or even 
all of them—to justify resort to gloss. Nevertheless, as discussed 
below, it is possible to perceive differences in emphasis between 
the justifications offered by interpreters, in particular a differ-
ence in emphasis between justifications centered on deference 
and justifications centered on Burkean consequentialism. 
Second, most if not all of the justifications assume that some 
amount of pragmatic reasoning is relevant to constitutional in-
terpretation in the separation-of-powers area. As the Supreme 
Court explained (in somewhat-dated language) when relying on 
past governmental practice in United States v Midwest Oil Co,41 
“government is a practical affair intended for practical men.”42 
The more that one conceives of constitutional interpretation as a 
formal enterprise, involving merely the application of objectively 
identifiable textual meaning or original understanding, the less 
one will perceive the various justifications for gloss to be rele-
vant. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court decision 
best known for declining to credit gloss, Immigration and  
Naturalization Service v Chadha,43 is highly formal in its rea-
soning.44 Nevertheless, it should be noted that even Supreme 
Court justices known for their commitment to constitutional 
formalism have accepted the potential relevance of gloss under 
some circumstances.45 
Third, another factor that is likely to affect the relevance of 
the above justifications for crediting gloss is the frequency of ju-
dicial review. Gloss argumentation thrives most when there is 
an absence of frequent judicial intervention, which is one reason 
it has been so common in the area of foreign affairs.46 When  
 
 41 236 US 459 (1915). 
 42 Id at 472. 
 43 462 US 919 (1983). 
 44 See id at 945 (“[P]olicy arguments supporting even useful ‘political inventions’ 
are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to 
this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.”). 
 45 See, for example, Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2594 (Scalia concurring in the judg-
ment) (“Of course, where a governmental practice has been open, widespread, and un-
challenged since the early days of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous constitutional provision.”); Stern v Marshall, 564 US 462, 504–05 
(2011) (Scalia concurring) (“[A]n Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, 
unless there is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary.”) (second emphasis 
added). 
 46 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 429 (cited in note 1). 
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engaging in constitutional reasoning, courts are more likely to 
focus on their own precedent and reasoning rather than on non-
judicial practices, so extensive judicial interventions will tend to 
displace judicial reliance on gloss. Moreover, because of the tra-
dition of judicial supremacy, political branch actors will typically 
coordinate around judicial decisions,47 so such decisions are likely 
to disrupt the ongoing development of practice. As a result, it is 
less likely in that situation that practices will become long-
standing before they are challenged, and also less likely that 
they will generate reliance interests.48 
II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOSS METHODOLOGY 
These differing justifications for gloss have differing impli-
cations for methodological questions concerning how to “do” 
gloss. This Part analyzes two such questions: what should count 
as “practice” when discerning gloss and whether a showing of in-
stitutional acquiescence should be required in order to establish 
gloss. 
A. What Counts as “Practice”? 
The historical gloss approach takes account of post-
Founding governmental practice in discerning the separation of 
powers. But what precisely constitutes the “practice” of govern-
mental institutions? Presumably it includes the enactment of 
statutes, which is the most obvious way in which Congress as an 
institution takes action. In United States v Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp,49 for example, the Court gave weight to the fact that Con-
gress had long enacted statutes giving broad foreign affairs au-
thority to the president to support its conclusion that the delega-
tion of criminalization authority in that case did not violate the 
separation of powers.50 Similarly, governmental practice also 
presumably includes presidential actions intended to have binding 
 
 47 See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 
115 Harv L Rev 4, 5–7 (2001) (describing the historical evolution of judicial supremacy 
and noting that modern politicians assume judicial supremacy “as a matter of course”). 
 48 Some of the tensions between judicial review and gloss can be eased by judicial 
“minimalism”—that is, “narrow, incompletely theorized rulings.” Sunstein, 105 Mich L 
Rev at 408 (cited in note 34). 
 49 299 US 304 (1936). 
 50 See id at 329 (“The uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice 
just disclosed rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution which, even if the practice 
found far less support in principle than we think it does, we should not feel at liberty at 
this late day to disturb.”). 
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effect—for example, a directive that US troops engage in com-
bat, the conclusion of an executive agreement, the appointment 
of officials during a Senate recess, or a declaration that the 
United States recognizes a particular foreign government. 
There are a variety of additional congressional and execu-
tive branch materials, however, that take positions on separation-
of-powers matters. For Congress, these materials include com-
mittee reports and nonbinding Senate and House resolutions. 
For the executive branch, they include legal memoranda (such 
as from the Office of Legal Counsel) and presidential signing 
statements. It is common for invocations of gloss to cite such 
materials,51 but there has been little express consideration of 
why they are relevant. If gloss concerns the iterative behavior of 
governmental institutions, one might think that the only rele-
vant consideration is their actual behavior, not their verbal 
claims about their (or the other branches’) authority.52 
The differing justifications for gloss yield potentially differ-
ent answers. Because the deference justification is focused on 
the views of the political branches, it presumably would treat as 
relevant their articulations of those views, even if not accompa-
nied by action. Indeed, their expression of constitutional views 
might be even more relevant than their actual behavior under 
this justification. Institutional behavior, after all, might be oc-
curring for a variety of reasons other than a particular under-
standing of the Constitution.53 What is most important for defer-
ence is that the political branches, staffed by officials sworn to 
uphold the Constitution, have considered the issue and endorsed 
a particular constitutional interpretation. 
There is, of course, an inherent danger of “cheap talk” when 
statements about the law are not accompanied by action. This 
danger, however, merely suggests that such statements should be 
considered with caution, not that they are irrelevant. Moreover, 
there might be evidence of the costliness of the statements even 
in the absence of practice—for example, if the statements are 
 
 51 See, for example, Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2562–64 (examining numerous re-
ports and opinions from both the legislative and executive branches to ascertain the 
branches’ historical views concerning the Recess Appointments Clause). 
 52 See Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers 
Disputes, 64 BU L Rev 109, 134 (1984) (contending that “mere assertions of authority to 
act are insufficient”). 
 53 See Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 Geo Wash L Rev 668, 684–
87 (2016) (describing how “a branch might act (let alone, not act) for many reasons not 
primarily motivated by constitutional analysis”). 
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contrary to short-term political interests. It is also worth keeping 
in mind that, in some instances, expressions of views about the 
separation of powers that are made in the abstract are likely to be 
less opportunistic than ones made in the midst of controversy. 
A wide range of materials could be relevant to discerning 
the constitutional understandings of the political branches. Even 
statements by individual members of Congress would potentially 
be relevant. Although such statements would not by themselves 
tell us the understanding of Congress as a whole (or even of a 
house of Congress or one of its committees), they could help re-
veal which constitutional propositions were generally taken for 
granted and which were disputed. Just as with resort to legisla-
tive history for interpreting statutes (which, although controver-
sial, is commonplace), more weight should presumably be given 
to committee reports than to statements by individual legisla-
tors. Even greater weight could be given to congressional resolu-
tions voted on by one or both houses of Congress—that is, to 
congressional “soft law.”54 
As for the executive branch, greater weight could be given to 
internal legal reasoning (which later becomes public) than to 
public argumentation (such as that in signing statements), be-
cause the former would presumably reflect a more candid ex-
pression of views. And, again, expressions of constitutional 
views that are contrary to apparent political interests may be 
especially telling. 
Another reason for looking to expressions of views by gov-
ernmental officials stems from concerns about judicial capacity: 
it is difficult to know how to describe practice for purposes of 
making claims about gloss without considering how that prac-
tice is understood by its participants. As with all appeals to cus-
tom (and to judicial precedent55), there will inevitably be a ques-
tion about the appropriate level of generality at which to 
describe the past practice, something that the practice itself can-
not resolve. To help resolve this issue, it can be useful to look to 
how participants in the practice understand its generalizability, 
which requires looking to the claims they make about gloss and 
not just to their practice. 
 
 54 Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Prac-
tice, 61 Stan L Rev 573, 603 (2008) (noting that nonbinding congressional resolutions 
and other forms of “soft law” are “better indicator[s] of legislative views than legislative 
inaction”). 
 55 See generally Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 Mich L Rev 179 (2014). 
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Nevertheless, some of the other justifications for gloss would 
place more weight on the actual behavior of institutions than on 
their stated views. For example, Burkean consequentialism 
treats as presumptively valid long-standing patterns of govern-
mental conduct, but the same rationale would not necessarily 
apply to mere long-standing claims about the Constitution un-
supported by conduct.56 The reliance justification falls some-
where in between: actual behavior is more concrete evidence 
that there has been reliance, but it is still possible that there 
will have been reliance, or institutional bargains, based on 
statements about the law. 
If one is focused on institutional behavior, there is still a 
question of what constitutes behavior. In particular, there is a 
question about whether institutional inaction is a type of behav-
ior. In theory, inaction could be relevant both for justifications 
focused on constitutional understandings and for justifications 
focused on patterns of behavior, although for different reasons. 
Inaction in the face of action by another branch might be ev-
idence of agreement with the constitutionality of that action, es-
pecially if there would otherwise be political incentives to con-
test the legality of the action. Similarly, if a branch considers 
acting and then refrains from doing so after legal claims are 
made against it, its inaction might suggest agreement with the 
claims. The Supreme Court relied on this sort of evidence in 
Zivotofsky, in support of an exclusive presidential power to rec-
ognize foreign sovereigns and their territory.57 
Of course, there will often be potential explanations for in-
action other than constitutional agreement, such as political cal-
culation, institutional paralysis, or inattention, so this sort of ev-
idence must be examined carefully.58 An institution’s failure to 
raise a constitutional objection to another branch’s practice 
should be given more weight when the institution is actively fo-
cused on the practice—for example, when it is opposing instances 
 
 56 See Sunstein, 105 Mich L Rev at 356 (cited in note 34). 
 57 See Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2092 (emphasizing that Congress had refrained from 
recognizing the independence of Spanish colonies in South America in the early nine-
teenth century in the face of constitutional arguments that the recognition power rested 
exclusively with the president). 
 58 Because of Congress’s collective action and partisan limitations, it will often be 
difficult for it to oppose executive action through the formal act of passing legislation. As 
a result, it can be problematic to treat Congress’s failure to enact legislation as “inac-
tion,” especially when Congress has engaged in other measures designed to express op-
position. See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 446, 451–52 (cited in note 1). 
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of the practice on policy grounds or is otherwise regulating in 
the area. Thus, in Noel Canning, the Court emphasized that 
even when the Senate was addressing issues relating to recess 
appointments in the twentieth century, it had not argued that it 
was unconstitutional for the president to make recess appoint-
ments during intrasession breaks or for vacancies that occurred 
prior to the break.59 
Even when inaction does not show constitutional agree-
ment, however, it could still show a pattern of institutional be-
havior and thus potentially be relevant to justifications that are 
not focused as much on shared constitutional understandings. 
In particular, inaction in the face of long-standing practice by 
another branch might confirm that the practice is stable or en-
trenched. This might help explain why the Court in Zivotofsky 
treated as relevant the lack of congressional regulation of recog-
nition throughout much of the twentieth century without at-
tempting to establish that this inaction was the result of a per-
ception by Congress that it lacked authority to regulate.60 
In evaluating the weight to be given to either expressions of 
constitutional views or behavior, another complication is that of 
party affiliation.61 A significant limitation on the idea that the 
political branches will act to safeguard their institutional inter-
ests—an idea associated most famously with James Madison’s 
Federalist 5162—is the commitment of governmental actors to 
their political party. This means, for example, that a Congress 
controlled by the president’s political party is less likely to resist 
presidential incursions on congressional authority than one con-
trolled, in whole or in part, by the opposition party.63 Congres-
sional inaction in the face of presidential assertions of authority, 
therefore, is more probative when it occurs during periods of di-
vided government, regardless of whether one is looking for com-
mon constitutional understandings or entrenched institutional 
 
 59 See Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2563–64, 2572–73. 
 60 See Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2093–94. 
 61 See generally Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, 
Not Powers, 119 Harv L Rev 2311 (2006). 
 62 See Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob 
E. Cooke, ed) (arguing that “the great security” of separation of powers “consists in giv-
ing to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and 
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others”). 
 63 See Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2324 (cited in note 61) (observing 
that “the political interests of elected officials generally correlate more strongly with party 
than with branch”). 
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practice. Conversely, congressional opposition is more probative 
when it comes from the president’s own party. 
Whether focused on views or behavior, there is no precise 
metric for how long the practice must have persisted before be-
ing given weight as gloss. The deference justification would pre-
sumably require the least amount of time, given that the politi-
cal branches could reach a common understanding about the 
Constitution in a relatively short period. Some of the other justi-
fications, such as Burkean consequentialism and reliance inter-
ests, are, by contrast, likely to be focused on long-term accre-
tions of practice. In Noel Canning, in which the Court was 
concerned about “upset[ting] the compromises and working ar-
rangements that the elected branches of Government them-
selves have reached”64 and about “seriously shrink[ing] the au-
thority that Presidents have believed existed and have exercised 
for so long,”65 the Court observed that “three-quarters of a century 
of settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great 
weight in a proper interpretation’ of the constitutional provision.”66 
In sum, determining what should properly count as “prac-
tice” depends in part on the justifications for gloss. In particular, 
justifications grounded in deference to political branch under-
standings are likely to credit a wide range of materials, includ-
ing “soft law” materials, that help reveal such understandings. 
By contrast, Burkean justifications and justifications grounded 
in judicial capacity are likely to emphasize long-standing pat-
terns of government action and inaction, even when it is not clear 
that the patterns are the result of constitutional understandings. 
B. Must There Be Institutional “Acquiescence” in the Practice? 
The Supreme Court has suggested in a number of decisions 
that, in order to establish gloss, it must be shown that the af-
fected branch has “acquiesced” in the practice in question, and 
this is what Justice Frankfurter claimed in Youngstown.67 This 
claim is also common in academic commentary about gloss.68 The 
 
 64 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2560. 
 65 Id at 2573. 
 66 Id at 2564. 
 67 See Youngstown, 343 US at 613 (Frankfurter concurring) (accepting that the 
“long-continued acquiescence of Congress” can “giv[e] decisive weight to a construction 
by the Executive of its powers”). 
 68 See, for example, David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law 111 (Cambridge 
2010) (noting that for historical practice to inform interpretation of the separation of 
powers, one must ask “whether the opposing branch in the separation-of-powers struggle 
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executive branch has been less committed to this proposition, 
sometimes contending that long-standing executive branch prac-
tice made under claim of right is sufficient to establish gloss.69 
As with what counts as “practice,” whether acquiescence 
should be required, and the evidence that would be needed to es-
tablish it, will depend on the justifications for relying on gloss. 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the idea of ac-
quiescence could encompass a variety of interbranch relations. It 
could mean express agreement between the branches about a 
proposition of constitutional law.70 Or it could involve agreement 
about operational feasibility and desirability, as opposed to le-
gality in a formal sense. Or it could mean simply a failure by one 
branch to resist claims of constitutional authority by another 
branch, for whatever reason. 
The justification that most closely depends on a showing of 
acquiescence is the deference justification. If the claim is that 
the two political branches have long had a shared understanding 
of the separation of powers, the claim will require an especially 
strong form of acquiescence: actual interbranch agreement about 
the law. Mere long-standing practice and lack of resistance by 
another branch will not be sufficient.71 
Importantly, though, even some variants of the deference 
rationale might not depend on a clear showing of acquiescence. 
In particular, if one branch has long articulated a constitutional 
view about the separation of powers and the other branch has 
been silent, it may not be clear whether there is any agreement 
between the branches. Nevertheless, the views of the branch 
that has maintained the position may still be entitled to some 
deference, especially if these views have been consistent and 
have reflected the views of both major political parties.72 After 
 
has actually accepted or ‘acquiesced’ in the practice”); Glennon, 64 BU L Rev at 134 (cited 
in note 52) (contending that the affected branch “must have acquiesced in the custom”). 
 69 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 459–60 (cited in note 1). 
 70 See, for example, Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on 
the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion *3 (Harvard National Security Journal 2011), 
archived at http://perma.cc/VA76-E2Y3 (contending that, although “practice can affect 
the Constitution’s meaning and allocation of power,” “[a] practice of constitutional di-
mension must be regarded by both political branches as a juridical norm” before it does so). 
 71 For one articulation of this position, see Roisman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 710 
(cited in note 53) (proposing that the only historical practice that should be credited is 
that which “is likely to be indicative of constitutional agreement between the branches”). 
 72 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 460 (cited in note 1). See also, for 
example, Office of Legal Counsel, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya at *7 (cited in 
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all, as Frankfurter observed in Youngstown, long-standing exec-
utive practice is “engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn 
to uphold the Constitution.”73 Similarly, in Noel Canning, the 
Supreme Court gave weight to the fact that “the publicly avail-
able opinions of Presidential legal advisers that we have found 
are nearly unanimous in determining that the [Recess Appoint-
ments] Clause authorizes” appointments during intrasession 
breaks.74 
Moreover, even if it requires a showing of acquiescence, the 
deference justification would not necessarily require interbranch 
agreement about the constitutional text. Instead, it could be 
premised on the idea that part of constitutional reasoning is 
pragmatic (such as structural reasoning, as well as of course 
consequentialist reasoning), and that the political branches will 
have a better understanding than courts do of the operational 
feasibility and desirability of particular separation-of-powers ar-
rangements. This idea seems to be reflected in the suggestion 
that is sometimes made by the Supreme Court and executive 
branch lawyers that gloss entails a “practical construction” of 
the Constitution.75 The more that we accept that constitutional 
interpretation involves an exercise in pragmatic judgment, the 
less we will require that the nonjudicial actors have formulated 
understandings about the text or original understanding of the 
Constitution, as opposed to what works well. 
The other justifications for gloss have an even weaker con-
nection to any requirement of acquiescence. For example, 
Burkean consequentialism might support looking to historical 
practice even in the absence of any evidence of acquiescence be-
cause of its focus on the value of established ways of doing 
things and a concern about the risks of change.76 Similarly, lim-
its on judicial capacity might suggest deferring to practice even 
if it does not clearly reflect a common understanding of the political 
 
note 15) (stressing that the war powers practice not only “extended over many decades” 
but was also “engaged in by Presidents of both parties”). 
 73 Youngstown, 343 US at 610 (Frankfurter concurring). 
 74 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2562. 
 75 See, for example, The Pocket Veto Case, 279 US 655, 675 (1929); Field v Clark, 
143 US 649, 691 (1892); 18 Op Off Legal Counsel at 233 (cited in note 13). 
 76 See Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and En-
trenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev 
535, 557–58 (2016) (contending that Burkean justifications for crediting historical prac-
tice do not require a showing of institutional acquiescence). 
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branches, because the practice can still provide a type of prece-
dent external to a court’s preferences. 
Once again, the reliance justification is uncertain: it is pos-
sible to imagine reliance occurring even in the absence of acqui-
escence, but it is also possible to insist that such reliance be 
“reasonable” before it will be credited, which may simply take us 
back to the initial question whether acquiescence is required in 
order for gloss to be credited. That said, disrupting even unrea-
sonable reliance can pose concerns about institutional and so-
cial upheaval and unintended consequences of the sort that un-
derlie some of the risk aversion associated with Burkean 
consequentialism. 
In short, under many of the potential justifications for gloss, 
institutional acquiescence is less central than is commonly as-
sumed. Importantly, however, even if one does not require a 
showing of acquiescence, there may be other reasons for insist-
ing on some sort of subjective understanding in addition to look-
ing to patterns of practice. As noted above, looking to such an 
understanding may be needed in order to determine the appro-
priate level of generality at which to describe the practice. In 
addition, resort to such an understanding may be needed to dis-
tinguish gloss from what Commonwealth theorists call “consti-
tutional conventions,” which are “maxims, beliefs, and principles 
that guide officials in how they exercise political discretion.”77 
Because both gloss and conventions concern practice-based 
norms of governmental conduct, it can be tempting to lump 
them together.78 But doing so misses an important difference be-
tween them: whereas conventions rest on either a fear of politi-
cal sanctions or a sense of political morality,79 practice-based 
norms that amount to gloss also rest on claims about the content 
of constitutional law. Claims about gloss are claims about legal 
authority to act and the limits of such authority, and deviations 
are considered to be breaches not simply of political norms, but 
also of legal obligation. To be sure, appeals to gloss and to con-
ventions sometimes overlap and can be difficult to distinguish, 
but this does not mean that they are analytically the same. 
 
 77 Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the 
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284 (2015). 
 79 See id at 288. 
 78  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:59 
   
The need to distinguish gloss from conventions is greater 
when courts are applying gloss than when it is invoked by non-
judicial actors. In Congress, for example, those who invoke gloss 
can often afford to be vague or imprecise about the boundary be-
tween conventions and constitutional law—appealing, for exam-
ple, to the “spirit” of the Constitution.80 A court attempting to re-
solve a dispute, however, will need to be more precise about 
what falls within and without the domain of binding constitu-
tional law.81 Similarly, executive branch lawyers providing legal 
advice may need to distinguish gloss from conventions. Such 
lawyers are unlikely to find it sufficient, for example, to lump 
together the convention of senatorial courtesy for judicial ap-
pointments with, say, gloss-based norms about the constitutional 
authority of the president to wage war. 
That said, it is important to remember that gloss is not typi-
cally invoked as a freestanding source of constitutional law. In-
stead, as the word “gloss” implies, it is treated as operating with 
and upon other modalities of interpretation, such as text, struc-
ture, purpose, and consequentialism.82 In part, this is a function 
of having a written Constitution and, relatedly, a constitutional 
culture that gives primacy to the text when it is perceived to be 
clear. This means, among other things, that historical practice is 
typically said to be relevant only when the constitutional text is 
ambiguous or silent on a question.83 In this respect, gloss is less 
 
 80 See Bradley and Siegel, 105 Georgetown L J at 274–80 (cited in note 17) (describ-
ing Congress’s mixture of conventional and constitutional objections to President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s Court-packing scheme); Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political 
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strue statutes to avoid “serious constitutional doubts.” See, for example, Jones v United 
States, 526 US 227, 239 (1999) (referring to “the rule, repeatedly affirmed, that where a 
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitu-
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to adopt the latter”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 82 See, for example, Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2091, 2094 (contending that “on balance 
[historical practice] provides strong support for the conclusion [based on text, judicial 
precedent, and consequentialist considerations] that the recognition power is the Presi-
dent’s alone,” and that this practice “confirms the Court’s conclusion”); Noel Canning, 
134 S Ct at 2561, 2570 (contending that historical practice “offers strong support” and 
“strongly favors” constructions of the Recess Appointments Clause that the Court other-
wise found persuasive based on considerations of purpose and consequentialism). 
 83 See LaCroix, 126 Harv L Rev F at 81 (cited in note 23) (“[H]istorical practice is 
relevant only in situations where the interpreter has first determined that text is unclear 
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imperialistic in its claims than some types of constitutional rea-
soning, such as some variants of textualism and originalism. 
Because of the supplementary nature of gloss reasoning, 
there is less need for a subjective element for gloss than for 
something like customary international law, which is treated as 
a freestanding body of binding law.84 Thus, if an interpreter is 
inclined for reasons other than gloss to think that an institution 
should have a particular type of authority, gloss may be useful 
even if it merely shows that the practice can be viewed as con-
sistent with that conclusion. This is one way to understand the 
Court’s decision in Zivotofsky: although it was unclear there 
whether the long-standing practice of presidential recognition 
of foreign governments was based on a shared constitutional 
understanding that Congress could not regulate the practice, 
the Court was able to cite the practice as at least not contra-
dicting its determination of exclusivity—a determination based 
largely on the Court’s views about constitutional structure and 
consequences.85 
CONCLUSION 
To understand how to do gloss, it is important first to un-
derstand why one is doing it. As this Essay has explained, there 
are a number of possible justifications for doing gloss, and they 
have differing methodological implications. In particular, while 
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justifications grounded in deference generally suggest looking 
for evidence of political branch understandings and agreement 
about the Constitution’s distribution of authority, justifications 
grounded in judicial capacity and Burkean consequentialism 
suggest looking primarily for stable patterns of institutional be-
havior. The implications of the reliance justification are more 
difficult to assess, in part because it may turn on contestable no-
tions of when reliance is justified. Disaggregating the justifica-
tions in this way helps explain why, for example, courts often 
place less emphasis on institutional acquiescence than commonly 
recited standards for gloss would tend to suggest. Whatever the 
justification, gloss is almost always treated as interconnected 
with other constitutional considerations rather than as a fully 
independent source of law, a phenomenon that reduces some of 
the pressure for methodological precision. 
